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ABSTRACT
The shareholder’s role in corporate management is evolving. In
CA, Inc. v. AFSCME, the Delaware Supreme Court likely expanded
that role in a ruling that signals the potential for greater shareholder
access to the corporate boardroom and enhanced director
accountability. The court determined that a shareholder proposal to
mandate reimbursement of certain board of director candidates was a
proper subject for shareholder bylaws. But the court also held that the
particular bylaw in question did not preserve the board’s ability to
exercise its fiduciary duties and, therefore, violated Delaware law.
Future bylaws governing director nominations and elections are likely
to include fiduciary-out clauses to preserve directors’ fiduciary duties.
Boards of directors can use those fiduciary outs to refuse
reimbursement to successful candidates, discouraging future
shareholder nominees.
This Note urges Delaware courts to review the exercise of such
fiduciary-out clauses under the strict standard of scrutiny articulated
in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp. The Blasius standard
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requires a compelling justification for a board’s decision to interfere
in shareholders’ election of directors. A board’s decision to invoke a
fiduciary-out clause to prevent the reimbursement of a successful
candidate would signal to all future candidates that the substantial
costs of the election process still must be borne by the nominating
party. The Delaware Supreme Court reiterated in CA, Inc. the
importance of shareholder participation in the nomination and
election of directors. To protect shareholders’ fundamental role, the
Blasius standard should be implemented to ensure shareholders’
attempts to nominate candidates are not thwarted by entrenched
boards of directors.

INTRODUCTION
In September 2004, the shareholders of Computer Associates
learned that the Department of Justice had indicted their company’s
1
former CEO for securities fraud and obstruction of justice. The
company itself had been charged with the same offenses, but it had
accepted responsibility and agreed to pay $225 million to the victims
2
of the fraud to avoid any further prosecution. Of course, Computer
Associates’ shareholders had been suspicious of accounting and
backdating fraud well before the actual indictment; many executives
had stepped down, and, by 2004, Computer Associates had become
3
“a symbol of weak corporate governance.” With the Enron and
Worldcom accounting scandals still fresh in the minds of both the
public and federal authorities, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) had promised to keep a “watchful eye” over
4
Computer Associates’ corporate governance in the years to follow.
1. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Computer Associates Executives Indicted on
Securities Fraud, Obstruction Charges (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov
/opa/pr/2004/September/04_crm_642.htm.
2. Id. Two years later, the two men charged by the Department of Justice—Sanjay
Kumar, the company’s former CEO, and Stephen Richard—the former head of sales, pled
guilty. Ex-CA Chief Kumar Pleads Guilty, CNNMONEY.COM, Apr. 25, 2006,
http://money.cnn.com/2006/04/24/technology/kumar/index.htm.
3. Richard Waters, Former CA Executives Charged with Fraud, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2004,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d63c16c8-0cb8-11d9-b543-00000e2511c8.html (“The settlement ends a
saga in which CA become [sic] a symbol of weak corporate governance and suspect accounting
in the technology industry.”).
4. See Cynthia L. Webb, Hammer Time for Computer Associates, WASH. POST, Sept. 23,
2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A44284-2004Sep23.html (“CA will be
under the watchful eye of the Securities and Exchange Commission for a year and a half under a
deal with the Justice Department and will have to shell out $225 million to pay back
shareholders.”).
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But that same company, operating under the new name CA, Inc.
5
(CA), would be fighting its shareholders again only four years later.
And thus, in 2008, CA found itself, once again, in the crosshairs of its
shareholders and at the crossroads of corporate governance.
The financial crisis that snowballed throughout the United States
in 2008 only accentuated problems with corporate governance that
6
had been in existence for some time. The crisis, at times compared to
7
the Great Depression, left many searching for a readily identifiable
culprit for the country’s economic malaise. They found easy targets in
8
the corporate boardroom. The public outcry has brought even
9
greater scrutiny of the behavior of corporate America. Many argued
that problems stemmed from a failure to oversee executive
compensation; indeed, the Obama administration has made efforts to
10
create executive compensation oversight. But in many ways,
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. For further discussion of the protracted debate over proper corporate governance, see
infra Part I.A.
7. See, e.g., Paul B. Farrell, 30 Reasons for Great Depression 2 by 2011, MARKETWATCH,
Nov. 19, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/well-great-depression-2-2011/story.aspx
?guid=%7BB28B49B5-EFD1-4941-B57E-A2BA1545BA09%7D (noting that the 2008 financial
downturn might eventually become a second Great Depression).
8. See, e.g., Susanne Craig, Cuomo, Frank Seek to Link Executive Pay, Performance,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2009, at C1 (discussing lawmakers’ attempts to control executive
compensation and noting that “[c]ompensation became a big issue in late 2008 when the
government was forced to step in to cover mounting losses on Wall Street”).
9. The SEC recognized the need to react to the economic crisis with potential rule
changes that indicate greater scrutiny of the current state of corporate governance and
shareholder participation in the election of directors. The SEC began one such proposed rule
change with the following strong language:
The nation and the markets have recently experienced, and remain in the midst
of, one of the most serious economic crises of the past century. This crisis has led
many to raise serious concerns about the accountability and responsiveness of some
companies and boards of directors to the interests of shareholders, and has resulted in
a loss of investor confidence. These concerns have included questions about whether
boards are exercising appropriate oversight of management, whether boards are
appropriately focused on shareholder interests, and whether boards need to be more
accountable for their decisions regarding such issues as compensation structures and
risk management. In light of the current economic crisis and these continuing
concerns, the Commission has determined to revisit whether and how the federal
proxy rules may be impeding the ability of shareholders to hold boards accountable
through the exercise of their fundamental right to nominate and elect members to
company boards of directors.
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33–9049 & 3460089, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 29,025 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
232, 240, 249, 274).
10. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 8 (arguing for limitations on director compensation to tie
performance and compensation); David Stout, Paulson Gives Way on C.E.O. Pay, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/business/economy/25cong.html (discussing
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executive compensation is merely a red herring and a symptom of
11
larger problems. Indeed, congressional reaction to the crisis has
indicated the widespread belief that “among the central causes of the
financial and economic crises that the United States faces today has
12
been a widespread failure of corporate governance.” This Note
suggests that, rather than legislate caps on executive pay and
13
bonuses, lawmakers could use shareholder oversight of directors as a
mechanism to help create accountability for those directors’
decisions. Because the call for limits on executive compensation is
actually symbolic of a host of problems with current corporate
governance, the best solutions may be found through an enhanced
role for shareholders. The flurry of activity surrounding executive
compensation likely reflects a political and public sentiment that
14
supports greater shareholder activity. By protecting shareholders’
rights to meaningfully participate in the nomination and election of
15
directors, corporate law can ensure that those who own the company
ultimately have the ability to ensure the accountability of
management.
the pressure on Henry Paulson to include limits and regulations on executive compensation
prior to providing any bailout).
11. It is also particularly difficult to quantify the value of executives when relatively small
distinctions in an executive’s skills or performance can have major impacts on a company’s
financial success and the return to its investors. See, e.g., Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Principles for
Reforming Executive Pay, BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 6, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/
managing/content/jan2009/ca2009016_165415.htm (listing some of the challenges facing the
111th Congress with regard to executive pay and the difficulties of balancing appropriate risktaking and the public desire for less exorbitant compensation); see also John F. Olson, Professor
Bebchuk’s Brave New World: A Reply to “The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise,” 93 VA. L.
REV. 773, 782 (2007) (“[E]ven tiny differences in managerial talent can translate into significant
disparities in the market value of today’s giant corporations, providing a legitimate rationale for
offering what may at first glance appear to be excessive compensation.”).
12. Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. § 2(1) (2009).
13. See Heineman, supra note 11 (recommending a perspective on executive pay that
balances risk-taking, which promotes innovation, with responsible management of risk).
14. This sentiment is evidenced by the relative success of the “say on pay” legislation as
well as the importance attributed to shareholders in Senator Charles E. Schumer’s Shareholder
Bill of Rights proposed legislation. See Joshua Brockman & John Ydstie, Washington Puts the
Squeeze on Executive Pay, NPR, Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php
?storyId=114048511 (noting that Congress is considering legislation that would give
shareholders more power over executive compensation); see also S. 1074 § 2 (discussing in its
findings the failure of “executive management and boards of directors . . . to enact
compensation policies that are linked to the long-term profitability of their institutions”).
15. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 109 (9th ed. 2005) (“Traditionally, shares of
common stock are conceived as ownership or equity interests in the corporation, so that the
body of common shareholders are the corporation’s owners.” (emphasis omitted)).
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Although the management of a company traditionally controls
day-to-day operations, the board of directors, strapped with fiduciary
duties to the shareholders, oversees management and ensures that the
choices management makes and the company’s general business plan
are in the best interests of all shareholders. One way to enhance
shareholder access to board of director elections would be to allow
shareholders proxy access to the nomination of new directors for a
company. Proxy access allows shareholders to influence corporate
policies by presenting their proposals alongside those of the
16
distributed by
management in the proxy voting materials
management. SEC rules allow shareholders to then vote on the
entirety of the proposals put forth by both management and other
17
shareholders. Theoretically, then, shareholders already have the
capability of nominating and voting new directors onto the board.
Shareholders can make directors accountable for decisions they make
that are not in the best interests of the shareholders, including, for
18
example, giving excessive compensation to management. But
shareholders’ practical ability to nominate and elect new directors has
been largely nonexistent due to prohibitive costs and a lack of
19
organization. Thus, shareholders of some companies have been
trying to change their company’s bylaws to allow shareholders greater
participation.
20
In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, the Delaware
Supreme Court may have signaled a movement toward greater

16. These materials include both the material necessary for shareholders to designate their
votes and certain information that the board has determined that shareholders need to make
such decisions, including, in some cases, shareholder-initiated proposals. See id. at 274–81
(discussing the disclosures made by registered corporations and the terminology and materials
used in proxy voting).
17. See
SEC
Staff
Legal
Bulletin
No.
14A
(2002),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14a.htm (discussing the provisions of Rule 14a-8 and its
functions within the shareholder proxy context).
18. In corporate law, shareholders select the board of directors, which in turn is responsible
for the hiring and compensation of management. See EISENBERG, supra note 15, at 154–55
(explaining the basic structure and interactions of corporations in the United States).
19. See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The SEC, Corporate Governance and Shareholder Access to
the Board Room, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1339, 1341–42 (discussing the original absence of director
nominations by shareholders and the cost of proxy elections). Professor Brown also notes that
the “costs of complying with the rules in many cases render a solicitation [of votes for a director
nominee] prohibitively expensive.” Id. at 1341 (citing Kenneth J. Bialkin, Why, When and How
to Conduct a Proxy Context for Corporate Control, in 5 SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES ch. 66
(2006)).
20. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008).
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director accountability to shareholders and greater shareholder proxy
21
access to director elections. The court determined that a proposal to
amend CA’s bylaws to require that stockholders be reimbursed for
reasonable expenses incurred in nominating candidates in a contested
director election was a permissible subject for a shareholder action
22
under Delaware law. The court held, however, that the particular
proposal in question was not allowed under Delaware law because it
would have required directors to reimburse a candidate, even if doing
so would require them to violate their fiduciary duty to the
23
shareholders. But the court indicated that the inclusion of something
24
like a fiduciary-out clause would remedy that concern. A fiduciaryout clause requirement, however, could be a major limitation on
shareholders’ ability to nominate and elect their own candidates
because directors may exercise broad discretion in claiming the
protection of these clauses to deny shareholders reimbursement and
support their own entrenchment on the board. Ordinarily, such board
decisions would receive deferential treatment from courts under a
25
standard known as business judgment deference.
This Note argues that Delaware courts should use a stricter
standard of review when directors attempt to promote entrenchment
by rejecting reimbursement through reliance on fiduciary-out clauses.
Because determining the proper standard of review “to judge director

21. Indeed, in response to CA, Inc. and the financial crisis in general, the SEC has
proposed rule changes that seek to inject greater shareholder participation into the nomination
and election of directors. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release
Nos. 33-9046 & 34-60089, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 29,025 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, 274).
22. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237.
23. Id. at 238.
24. See id., 953 A.2d at 240 (holding that the Bylaw mandating reimbursement for the costs
of shareholder-nominated candidates was a violation of Delaware law solely because it might, in
some situations, require the board to violate its fiduciary duty to the company); see also infra
notes 124–27 and accompanying text. Fiduciary-out clauses usually limit the board of directors.
See infra Part III.A. Here, they would function to prevent any proxy that passes from requiring
the directors to reimburse candidates when the directors’ fiduciary duties to shareholders would
otherwise prevent them from doing so. See infra Part III.B.
25. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927–28 (Del. 2003) (“[T]he
business judgment rule is a ‘presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company.’” (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651
A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995))); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 815 (Sup. Ct. 1976)
(holding that, absent bad faith, stockholders may not question a board of directors’ exercise of
its discretion when the board is carrying out ordinary business decisions, such as declaring
dividends). For further explanation of business judgment deference, see infra Part IV.B.1.
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26

action often determines the outcome of the case,” preserving the
meaning of the CA, Inc. decision requires that courts scrutinize
boards’ attempts to use fiduciary-out clauses under the stricter
27
standard introduced in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp. Part I
of this Note discusses the corporate governance background leading
up to the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in CA, Inc. Part II
illustrates the specific shareholder rights the court recognized in the
CA, Inc. opinion. Part III then addresses the lingering questions left
by the court’s opinion and argues that the inclusion of a fiduciary-out
clause would place the proposed bylaw in accord with Delaware law,
thus quieting the court’s concern. Part IV concludes that, given the
necessity of these fiduciary-out clauses in future bylaws, the Delaware
Supreme Court must take care to prevent the abuse of such clauses.
The court should use a Blasius standard of review when any board
uses a fiduciary-out clause to obstruct shareholder nominees for
contested director elections. Only the Blasius standard requires the
appropriate compelling justification for the board’s decision in
instances in which directors would be likely to try to protect their
28
seats on the board.
I. FRAMING THE DEBATE AND STATING
THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
The debate over the proper methods of corporate governance
and the appropriate balance between shareholder influence and
director control is longstanding. In CA, Inc., however, the Delaware
Supreme Court reiterated the importance of shareholder
participation in director elections, seemingly taking the proshareholder side of the debate. Within that corporate governance
context, both the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) and

26. Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 90 (Del. 1992) (citing AC Acquisitions Corp. v.
Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986)).
27. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
28. This Note does not engage the discussion of whether greater shareholder access is
beneficial. For a brief discussion of the ongoing debate involving shareholders’ rights to proxy
access and corporate governance, see infra Part I.A. The assumption herein is that the Delaware
Supreme Court’s language and conclusions in CA, Inc. indicate that greater access to elections
via reimbursement is a worthwhile goal for a proxy vote. Thus, to protect what the court asserts,
and this Note agrees, is a worthwhile end, lower courts must refrain from using deferential
standards of review for director decisions. Otherwise, the access to director elections enhanced
by reimbursement will be undercut by director discretion over when to provide those
reimbursements.
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SEC rules have a place. And though the SEC has occasionally
disagreed with the courts when promulgating its rules of corporate
governance, CA, Inc. marked the first time the SEC allowed the
Delaware Supreme Court to decide a question addressed to the SEC.
The result was an implication of deference by the SEC to the
interpretations of the Delaware Supreme Court. This Part explains
the background rules and concepts that make clear the importance of
the CA, Inc. decision.
A. The Debate Over Shareholder Access and Bylaw Proposals
One of the key issues in corporate governance is the need for
oversight to ensure that corporate management does not engage in
29
purely self-serving activity. The current means of monitoring
corporate management provide that those who oversee
management—members of the board of directors—must be truly
30
independent from the company. But there have been a number of
31
problems with the definition of director independence. In response
to the financial crisis of 2008, Congress undertook an effort to help
shareholders have a greater voice in the face of corporate
32
mismanagement. One key means of shareholder participation and
33
oversight, as previously discussed, is via the proxy contest.
Proxy contests were once considered inefficient and were rare
34
well into the late 1980s and early 1990s. Their importance grew in

29. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 19, at 1339–40 (“With management having an incentive to
engage in self-serving activities, shareholders need a mechanism designed to minimize this type
of behavior.”); Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 139, 140 (2009) (book review) (noting that a central concern in the hierarchy of a
corporation is the temptation that exists when the large amount of wealth created by the
corporation is placed under the control of the few members that comprise the board). Professor
Brown utilizes the term “agency cost” to describe the problem of finding an efficient means of
monitoring corporate managers. Brown, supra note 19, at 1339–40.
30. See Brown, supra note 19, at 1340 (“The latest [monitoring system for management] is
reliance on independent directors to watch out for the interests of shareholders.”).
31. Id. at 1340–41 (noting the slew of problems with the current definition of independence
and concluding that “[a]llowing shareholders to nominate and elect their own candidates
sidesteps these problems”).
32. See supra note 8.
33. See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text.
34. See Irwin H. Warren & Kevin G. Abrams, Evolving Standards of Judicial Review of
Procedural Defenses in Proxy Contests, 47 BUS. LAW. 647, 648 (1992) (noting that the “proxy
contest for the election of directors continues to be a relatively rare occurrence”).
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the 1990s, however, due to the increase in institutional investors
along with the increase in the ability of boards of directors to thwart
36
changes in control launched via tender offers. With new, higherprofile shareholders and institutional investors came new questions;
conflicts between activist investors and boards of directors created a
debate about whether shareholders ought to be given oversight of
37
director decisionmaking. But deference to case-by-case development
38
of the law instead of legislation, a tenet of Delaware corporate law,
likely led to the slow development of a consistent body of corporate
39
governance law. In the last decade, however, high-profile board
crises like that of Hewlett-Packard have stoked the public debate
over the appropriate level of shareholder participation in corporate
40
governance.
35. “Institutional investors” in this Note refers to large companies, like pension funds or
insurance companies, or wealthy individuals that buy and sell large enough quantities of a
security that they may receive preferential treatment and avoid some regulation because they
are presumed to be sophisticated. BusinessDictionary.com, Institutional Investors Definition,
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/institutional-investors.html (last visited Feb. 28,
2010).
36. See Damon A. Silvers & Michael I. Garland, The Origins and Goals of the Fight for
Proxy Access 1–3 (2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
dir-nominations/silversgarland022004.pdf (stating that “[t]he current vigorous debate on the
place of shareholder nominated directors in the public company proxy solicitation process” is a
product of scandals in 2001 as well as the growth of institutional investors and the conclusion
that “shareholders could not directly hold managers accountable”).
37. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93
VA. L. REV. 675 (2007) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Myth] (discussing the problems with democratic
oversight by shareholders); Olson, supra note 11 (arguing that Bebchuk “offers scant empirical
support for either the proposition that shareholders have little power to effect director changes
or the argument that boosting shareholders’ ability to force such changes will improve
performance”); E. Norman Veasey, Essay, The Stockholder Franchise Is Not a Myth: A
Response to Professor Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 811 (2007) (contending that shareholder power
to affect change has actually grown in recent decades); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for
Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43 (2003) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder
Access] (arguing for the adoption of measures which would increase shareholder access); Martin
Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the Company’s Proxy: An Idea Whose
Time Has Not Come, 59 BUS. LAW. 67 (2003) (contending that “[a]llowing shareholders to run
an election contest through the company’s proxy statement . . . would be a serious mistake”).
38. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1752 (2006) (referring to the “inherent conservatism” of Delaware
corporate law as a product of this case-by-case development of the law).
39. See Silvers & Garland, supra note 36, at 3 (discussing the rise of causes that expedited
the discussion and development of a corporate governance body of law over director elections).
40. See, e.g., Don Clark & Joann S. Lublin, H-P Is Urged to Overhaul Board in Wake of
Probe, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2006, at A2 (describing corporate governance experts’ calls for a
board overhaul as pension funds seek greater participation in the shareholder nomination
process); see also The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H.
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Scholars on one end of the debate, led by Professor Lucian
Bebchuk of Harvard University, argue for greater shareholder access
in order to provide a more accountable corporate governance
41
system. These scholars argue that shareholders currently have no
meaningful ability to respond to unsatisfactory board actions.
Because corporate law is built upon an assumption that shareholders
42
are the true owners of a corporation, the absence of meaningful
participation reflects a fundamental flaw in the legal justification for
43
placing control with and affording deference to the board. Bebchuk,
for example, focuses on enhancing shareholder value in corporations
44
as the primary function of management. He underscores the
importance of the board of directors’ fiduciary duties to the
shareholders, noting that the board is legally the agent of the
45
shareholders. And these fiduciary duties presuppose an ability on
the part of shareholders to elect new directors if and when they are
46
dissatisfied.

Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. 33 (2008) (statement of Alan
Greenspan, former Chairman, Federal Reserve) (“I made a mistake in presuming that the selfinterest of organizations, specifically banks and others, were such is [sic] that they were best
capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms.”); J. Robert Brown,
Jr., Returning Fairness to Executive Compensation, 84 N.D. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (2008) (“Board
authority is often better described as exercised in the best interests of management rather than
shareholders.” (citing The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators, supra)).
41. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Myth, supra note 37, at 676–78 (discussing his general arguments for
the need for an enhanced shareholder franchise); Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 37,
at 44–46 (arguing for the need for “[i]nvigorating [c]orporate [e]lections”); see also Silvers &
Garland, supra note 36, at 16–19 (listing recommendations for the SEC to enhance shareholder
access to director elections).
42. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 15, at 109 (noting that shareholders are the true
owners of corporations).
43. See Robert B. Thompson, Defining the Shareholder’s Role, Defining a Role for State
Law: Folk at 40, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 771, 778 (2008) (“[T]he corporate franchise is the
ideological underpinning on which the core premise of Delaware law rests as the justification for
permitting directors such broad control over other people’s money.”). See generally Bebchuk,
Myth, supra note 37 (contending that shareholders do not have the power to hold corporate
directors accountable); Bebchuk, Shareholder Access, supra note 37 (arguing for the adoption of
measures that would increase shareholder access); Silvers & Garland, supra note 36 (discussing
the history and current issues associated with proxy access).
44. See Bebchuk, Myth, supra note 37, at 678 (“I should stress that my analysis of election
reform in public companies [focuses] on the sole objective of enhancing shareholder value.”).
45. Id. at 679–80 (highlighting the role of the shareholder franchise in the philosophical
underpinnings of current corporate law).
46. Id. at 680.
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But opponents of enhanced shareholder access argue that the
47
board of directors should have primary authority, and scholars have
debated the extent to which shareholder bylaw proposals should ever
48
be allowed to limit a board of directors’ discretion. Those who
oppose shareholder access do so in part because they believe
institutional investors and shareholder activists will force a company
49
to become focused on short-term gains. Some believe that
“Delaware’s existing statutory and common law suggest that the
corporate form’s underlying structure is inconsistent with the use of
mandatory bylaws to control corporate activity and curtail board
50
authority.” Others, like Professor Lynn Stout, argue that the current
amount of board control is appropriate because limiting board
51
turnover has numerous efficiency advantages. These scholars assert

47. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 605 (2003) (concluding that the “power and right to
exercise decisionmaking fiat” are vested in members of the board of directors, who are not
“mere agent[s] of the shareholders” but the actual central authority figures); Veasey, supra note
37, at 816–18 (arguing that the current balance of corporate law is working through a movement
toward greater corporate governance and shareholder participation without Bebchuk’s
proposed amendments to legislation); Silvers & Garland, supra note 36, at 8 (“In order to
protect shareholders, therefore, the [Business Roundtable] believes the nominating committee
is best positioned to assess the skills and qualities desirable in new directors.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); cf. Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 37, at 82–84 (“There is no
question that giving shareholders access to the corporate proxy machinery to run an election
contest would facilitate the nomination and election of dissident and special interest
directors.”). But see Veasey, supra note 37, at 824 (“If effected by private ordering—whether
through stockholder-proposed bylaws, changes in the certificate of incorporation, or directorproposed bylaws—Bebchuk’s proposals, such as confidential voting or reimbursement of
expenses, are not objectionable.”). Chief Justice Veasey’s criticisms are in line with the point of
this Note. The very development of law apparent in CA, Inc. indicates the case-by-case trend
toward greater corporate governance. For this reason, Chief Justice Veasey would likely
support the development of greater shareholder access to director elections when it occurs
organically within the Delaware court system.
48. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted
By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REV. 409, 425–33, 479 (1998) (discussing
arguments regarding the propriety of shareholder oversight of director decisionmaking).
49. See, e.g., Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 37, at 78 (“[M]any institutional and other
activist investors have competing interests that may conflict with the best interests of the public
corporation . . . . Different investors have different time horizons. Some may seek to push the
corporation into steps designed to create a short-term pop in the company’s share price so that
they can turn a quick profit.” (footnote omitted)).
50. Fredrick H. Alexander & James D. Honaker, Power to the Franchise or the
Fiduciaries?: An Analysis of the Limits on Stockholder Activist Bylaws, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 749,
749–50 (2008).
51. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV.
789, 790–91 (2007) (arguing that “shareholders enjoy net benefits from board governance”
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that shareholder access to the boardroom does not actually result in a
52
benefit for most shareholders. A further complication in this debate
involves competing interpretations of the DGCL rules that most
specifically address whether shareholders have a place in the
53
management of a corporation.
The Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in CA, Inc. did not
54
attempt to resolve this debate; but, as discussed below, its holding
supported the court’s previous assertion that “[a] stockholder’s ability
to participate in corporate governance through the election of
55
directors is a fundamental part of our corporate law.” Likewise, the
court has previously stated that “[m]aintaining a proper balance”
between shareholder participation in the election and the board’s
actual management depends on “the stockholders’ unimpeded right
56
to vote effectively in an election of directors.” Given these
sentiments, the Delaware Supreme Court made a strong statement on
behalf of shareholders’ rights of access, at least when it comes to the
57
election process.
If the Delaware Supreme Court deems
shareholders’ access to director elections worth protecting, then other
courts should strive to avoid undercutting that determination in the
future.
B. Resolving the Tension Between the SEC’s Rules and Delaware
Corporate Law
The CA, Inc. case exemplified the increasingly murky
interrelation of Delaware’s traditional authority in corporate law, the
because it “promotes efficient and informed decisionmaking, discourages intershareholder
opportunism, and encourages valuable specific investments in corporate team production”).
52. See, e.g., id. at 791–92 (noting “the myth that shareholder control in public companies
actually benefits shareholders”).
53. For further discussion of the possible tension between DGCL Section 141(a) and
Section 109(b), see infra Part I.B.
54. Even critics of shareholder access, though, may grant that shareholder proposals for
reimbursement of proxy election expenses are acceptable because they deal more closely with
the election process than with company management. See, e.g., Alexander & Honaker, supra
note 50, at 766 (noting that such plans may be found less offensive to the “fiduciary decisionmaking model” because they are “intended to enhance the stockholders’ ability to elect new
directors, not to make decisions for the directors that are ultimately elected”).
55. Preston v. Allison, 650 A.2d 646, 649 (Del. 1994).
56. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003).
57. Again, the distinction between shareholder proposals involving the election process
and proposals that purport to manage corporate affairs is key. The CA, Inc. opinion does not go
so far as to claim that corporate management is now in the hands of shareholders, though
congressional sentiment may support such a move, see supra notes 8, 12 and accompanying text.
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SEC’s influence in the field via its promulgation of corporate
governance rules and no-action letters, and ultimately the willingness
of the SEC to defer to Delaware courts. Delaware is incredibly
influential in the development of corporate law in part because it is
the state in which the largest American companies choose to
58
incorporate. More than half of all publicly traded companies in the
59
United States are incorporated in Delaware. Though the DGCL has
traditionally been the bedrock of corporate law, the SEC has gained
60
increasing prominence through the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley
61
Act of 2002. The SEC’s enforcement and interpretative role has also
62
increased with respect to its corporate governance rules. The SEC’s
expanding influence may be greatest in the area of shareholder
activism, as many institutional investors are pressing for change
63
outside of the DGCL.
Although the statutes comprising Delaware corporate law are
specific in a number of contexts, they are relatively silent in the area
64
of corporate governance. After the Enron scandal, and again during
the 2008 financial crisis, the federal government has tried to fill that

58. Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in
Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 66 (2009) (“Delaware has visibly succeeded in claiming
the number one spot in attracting and retaining incorporations. Moreover, the preference for
Delaware incorporation is especially notable among the richest and most powerful American
corporations—a fact which undoubtedly contributes to the prestige and influence of Delaware
corporation law.”).
59. The Delaware government’s website boasts of the vast number of companies
incorporated in Delaware, as well as the state’s welcoming environment for those companies.
Del. Dep’t of State, Division of Corporations: About Agency, http://corp.delaware.gov/about
agency.shtml (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
60. See, e.g., Margaret E. Tahyar, The Dodd Bill’s Effect on Corporate Governance and
Executive Compensation Processes, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.,
Nov.
24,
2009,
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/11/24/the-dodd-bills-effect-on
-corporate-governance-and-executive-compensation-processes/#more-5627 (“The project of
federalizing major elements of our corporate governance and executive compensation processes
continues apace.”). Tahyar discusses the potential effects of proposed legislation in the arena of
corporate governance, including an expanded role for the SEC. Id.
61. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.).
62. Stevelman, supra note 58, at 90.
63. Cf. id. at 95–96 (“These [shareholder activist] forces are operating outside of the
traditional framework of state corporate law—that is, without amendment to the DGCL and
separate and apart from the judicial development of fiduciary standards. In prior periods,
corporate directors, officers, and their advisers could more easily insulate themselves from
shareholders’ demands and expectations.”).
64. See Thompson, supra note 43, at 776 (noting that there is a space left open within the
realm of corporate governance under Delaware law).
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65

void. Much of the federal law in the corporate governance arena can
be traced to Rule 14a-8, which provides a means for shareholders to
bring proposals to the board to be included in the proxy statements
66
that are then distributed to all of the company’s shareholders. When
shareholders seek to include a proposal in a company’s proxy
materials and management wants to exclude it, it is the SEC that
67
often determines who wins. Some of these determinations, however,
depend on state and not federal law. At times, then, there are
questions that must be answered in the space between Delaware’s
corporate law and the SEC’s oversight of director behavior and proxy
solicitation.
On the Delaware law side of the equation, the ability of
shareholders to adopt bylaws is in tension with the ability of directors
68
to manage the company unfettered. The tension exists specifically
69
between DGCL Sections 109(b) and 141(a). Section 109(b), which
addresses the appropriate content for bylaws, states that “the bylaws
may contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the
certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the
corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the
rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or

65. Id. at 776, 783. See generally Junis L. Baldon, Taking a Backseat: How Delaware Can
Alter the Role of the SEC in Evaluating Shareholder Proposals, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J.
105 (2009) (discussing the intertwined roles of federal and state law in corporate governance
and the potential effects of an enhanced relationship between the SEC and the Delaware
Supreme Court).
66. Thompson, supra note 43, at 779.
67. See, e.g., id. at 780 (“If management opposes the inclusion of the proposal, which is
often the case, management asks the SEC staff for a no-action letter, in effect, the staff’s
announcement that it would bring no enforcement action against the company were the
proposal to be omitted from the company’s proxy statement. The agency’s response comes in
[an SEC no-action letter] sent by a SEC staff member to the parties.” (footnote omitted)).
68. See Hamermesh, supra note 48, at 444 (characterizing the tension in DGCL rules by
stating that “the efforts to distinguish by-laws that permissibly limit director authority from bylaws that impermissibly do so have failed to provide a coherent analytical structure”); see also
Alexander & Honaker, supra note 50, at 753 (“Some commentators, however, posited a tension
between sections 141(a) and 109(b), suggesting that the provisions of the DGCL, standing
alone, would not resolve the question whether the bylaws may place limits on the board’s power
to manage the corporation.”).
69. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 234 (Del. 2008)
(discussing the interrelation of DGCL rules and concluding that “[t]he question left unanswered
is what is the scope of shareholder action that Section 109(b) permits yet does not improperly
intrude upon the directors’ power to manage corporation’s business and affairs under Section
141(a)”).
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70

employees.” That section, when read in conjunction with Section
109(a), appears to limit the subject matter that a bylaw can address.
Section 141(a), however, provides that “[t]he business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by
or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be
otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
71
incorporation.” Section 141(a), then, purports to provide for the
management of the company’s business affairs only by the board of
72
directors. Thus, tension arises when shareholders propose a bylaw
that the board of directors contends interferes with its management of
the company.
In addition to Delaware law, SEC rules govern certain actions by
boards and shareholders. Rule 14a-8 generally allows a board of
directors to exclude certain bylaw proposals from the distributed
proxy statement, the actual material that the directors send to
73
shareholders. The premise is that this rule helps preserve the board’s
ability to make ordinary business decisions. In 2006, a portion of the
rule, Rule 14a-8(i)(8), was subject to conflicting interpretations by the
Second Circuit and the SEC. Rule 14a-8(i)(8) provided that
companies may exclude a proposal “[i]f the proposal relates to an
election for membership on the company’s board of directors or
74
analogous body.” In AFSCME, Employees Pension Plan v.
75
American International Group, Inc., a case that involved a similar
question to the one ultimately raised in CA, Inc., the Second Circuit
was forced to answer whether a shareholder proposal could be
76
excluded under SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(8). The Second Circuit held that
a shareholder proposal requiring American International Group
(AIG) to allow shareholder nomination and election of candidates for
the board of directors could not be excluded from the company’s
77
proxy statement. The court held that the 14a-8(i)(8) election
exception only applied to bylaw proposals that would affect particular

70. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (2009).
71. Id. § 141(a).
72. Id.
73. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2009).
74. Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-56914, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450, 70,453 (Dec. 11, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8).
75. AFSCME, Employees Pension Plan v. Am. Int’l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir.
2006).
76. Id. at 125.
77. Id. at 131.

FAWAL IN FINAL READ

1472

3/4/2010 2:12:08 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:1457

78

elections, not the election process generally. The decision was met
with a great deal of optimism from advocates of greater shareholder
79
oversight, but scholars waited for the SEC’s response.
The SEC condemned the Second Circuit’s conclusion and
80
amended the language of Rule 14a-8(i)(8), nullifying the effect of
the AIG case. The Commission’s comments specifically state that
proposals such as the one at issue in AIG would be excludable under
81
the amended rule. The comments also note that, although this new
encapsulation of the rule is more expansive in its application to
nominations and procedures, “the changes to the rule text relate only
to procedures that would result in a contested election, either in the
82
year in which the proposal is submitted or in subsequent years.” The
SEC left the door open for proposals, like that in CA, Inc., that make
future contested elections more likely but do not necessarily result in
any particular election in a given year. Regardless, the conflict
between the Second Circuit and the SEC only underscores the
murkiness and unpredictability of the law surrounding corporate
governance. Indeed, one scholar has gone so far as to claim that “[i]n
no other area of corporate governance has the interrelation between
state and federal law become more important than the validity of
83
shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8.” Yet it has become
increasingly difficult to actually distinguish between state and federal
84
law in the area of corporate governance.
Tension was particularly problematic when Delaware corporate
law, the cornerstone of traditional corporate law, conflicted with the
SEC’s interpretation and enforcement of its own rules. In 2007, to
help avoid conflicting interpretations by the Delaware courts and the
SEC, Delaware amended its constitution to allow the SEC to certify

78. Id. at 129–30.
79. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Myth, supra note 37, at 708 (noting the importance of the court’s
opinion but also awaiting the SEC’s response).
80. See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-56914, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450, 70,453 (Dec. 11, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8) (noting the potential confusion the Second Circuit’s decision may have caused and
the need to clarify the meaning of Rule 14a-8(i)(8)).
81. Id. at 70,454.
82. Id.
83. Baldon, supra note 65, at 106.
84. See id. (“[I]n fact, these roles are so intertwined that it becomes difficult to tell a
coherent story about discrete federal versus state law and analysis.” (quoting Robert B. Ahdieh,
From Federal Rules to Intersystemic Governance in Securities Regulation, 57 EMORY L.J. 233,
235 (2007))).
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questions of law directly to the Delaware Supreme Court. The
amendment created an “expedited process for addressing corporate
law issues” and was aimed at bringing “greater certainty” to
86
corporate law. CA, Inc. was noteworthy because it was the first
instance in which the SEC chose to utilize this certification
87
capability. Previously, only other courts could certify questions of
law to the Delaware Supreme Court, and it was somewhat unclear
whether the SEC would even choose to exercise this ability, as it was
88
considered a showing of deference. Because corporate governance is
an area of particularly hot debate, some expected that it would be the
area in which the SEC might be most likely to need to send questions
89
to the court.
The importance of the SEC’s certification of questions,
particularly questions relating to corporate governance, cannot be
overstated. The sentiment leading up to the CA, Inc. decision was
that the case would be a landmark determination of key corporate
governance questions as well as a means of providing a single voice in

85. Press Release, Del. Supreme Court, Delaware Constitutional Amendment Enacted
Allowing the Securities and Exchange Commission to Bring Questions of Law Directly to the
Delaware Supreme Court (May 15, 2007), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/
Supreme%20Court/pdf/?deconstamend051507pdf.pdf; see also DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8)
(amended 2007) (providing the Delaware Supreme Court with the jurisdiction “[t]o hear and
determine questions of law certified to it by . . . the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission”).
86. Press Release, Del. Supreme Court, supra note 85; cf. J.W. Verret, Federal vs. State
Law: The SEC’s New Ability to Certify Questions to the Delaware Supreme Court, CORP.
GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Mar./Apr. 2008, at 12, 12, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1156527 (“This ability to provide advisory opinions, if utilized by the SEC, is poised to
enhance Delaware’s dominance as the state of incorporation for publicly traded corporations.”).
87. SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES, DELAWARE
SUPREME COURT ANSWERS QUESTIONS CERTIFIED BY SEC; REJECTS STOCKHOLDER BYLAW
REQUIRING REIMBURSEMENT OF PROXY SOLICITATION EXPENSES 1 (2008), available at
http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=51&itemID=1426 (noting that this decision
marked the first instance of the SEC certifying questions directly to the Delaware Supreme
Court); see also William D. Johnston, Del. Court Responds to SEC’s First Certified Questions,
VA. LAW. WKLY., Sept. 29, 2008, http://www.valawyersweekly.com/weeklyedition/2008/09/29
/del-court-responds-to-sec%E2%80%99s-first-certified-questions/ (detailing the process for the
first certification and the subsequent decision).
88. See Press Release, Del. Supreme Court, supra note 85 (“It is not clear how often the
Securities and Exchange Commission will accept Delaware’s invitation [to certify questions],
particularly in controversial areas of corporate governance.” (quoting Jeffrey D. Bauman,
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center)).
89. See Verret, supra note 86, at 12–13 (discussing and predicting the certification of
questions dealing with the proposal of bylaws that might limit a board’s discretion).
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areas that involved overlapping and often contradictory authorities.
CA, Inc. was anticipated as “the most significant corporate law case in
91
probably 10 years.” Professor J.W. Verret of George Mason Law
School argued that the court’s decision might change securities and
corporate law in a manner unseen since the Securities and Exchange
92
Act of 1933. And because the SEC certified the questions to the
Delaware Supreme Court, the SEC likely would not have the option
93
to then override the court’s decision as it did in AIG. Thus, the
rationale of the court is important, as it speaks for itself and for the
SEC.
II. THE CA, INC. DECISION
In CA, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court helped define the
contours of permissible shareholder activism within the context of
board of director oversight and company management. The court
determined that a shareholder bylaw proposal that called for
reimbursement of dissident director candidates was a proper subject
94
matter for a shareholder proposal under Delaware law. That
determination reflected the court’s belief that such proposals dealt
with the process of the election of directors, which is a proper subject
95
for shareholder input. The court found, however, that the proposal
violated Delaware law because it left no discretion to the board of
directors to decline reimbursement when it would cause the board to
96
violate its fiduciary duties to shareholders. Ultimately, the case
90. See Melissa Klein Aguilar, SEC Sends Proxy Question to Delaware, COMPLIANCE
WKLY., July 15, 2008, http://www.complianceweek.com/article/4258/sec-sends-proxy-questionto-delaware (outlining the various reactions to the SEC’s certification of its first question to the
Delaware Supreme Court).
91. Id. (quoting Charles Elson, Director, Corporate Governance Center at the University
of Delaware).
92. Id.
93. Indeed, as a result of the CA, Inc. decision, both the DGCL and the SEC contemplated
rule changes to incorporate the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision. The DGCL changes have
passed. The SEC proposed its rule change in May, but because of a large number of responses,
the final vote will not take place until sometime this year. Jesse Westbrook, SEC to Delay
Proxy-Access Rule, Giving Banks Reprieve, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 2, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a2ZCxme0W84Y. For the text of the
SEC’s proposed rule, see Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release
Nos. 33–9049 & 34-60089, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024, 29,025 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, 274).
94. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008).
95. Id.
96. See infra Part II.B.
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articulated a role for shareholders in the nomination process for
directors so long as future bylaw proposals carve out sufficient
discretion for the board of directors.
A. Factual Background
In March 2008, the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME), a stockholder of CA, proposed a
stockholder bylaw (Bylaw) for CA to include in the proxy materials it
97
would distribute during the 2008 proxy season. CA, formerly
Computer Associates, had a history of corporate governance
shortcomings, and AFSCME, a shareholder activist pension group,
proposed the Bylaw partially in response to a series of previous
98
problems. The proposed Bylaw required, most importantly, that CA
reimburse a stockholder for the reasonable expenses involved in
connection with a stockholder-nominated candidate’s run for the CA
99
board of directors. The proposal required reimbursement for
expenses of all candidates of the nominating party so long as, among
other conditions, one of the nominating party’s candidates was
100
successfully elected. The amount reimbursed could not exceed the
amount spent by the corporation in connection with the same
101
contested election. This proposal, if successful, would have removed
some discretion from the board, which previously had complete
102
discretion regarding the reimbursement of proxy contest expenses.
CA wanted to exclude this proposal from its proxy materials and
thus sought permission from the SEC in the form of an SEC no-action
letter, which would ensure that the SEC would not take action against
103
CA for the exclusion of the proposal. Because Rule 14a-8 allows
companies to exclude proposals that would violate the law of the
company’s state of incorporation, the SEC received separate opinions
from counsel for AFSCME and CA regarding the validity of the

97. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 229.
98. For a discussion of Computer Associates’ “weak corporate governance” and its
backdating and accounting issues during the early- to mid-2000s, see supra notes 1–4 and
accompanying text.
99. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 229–30.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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104

proposed Bylaw under Delaware law. The SEC received conflicting
opinions from Delaware counsel regarding the likely outcome under
Delaware law, so the SEC exercised its power to certify questions to
105
the Delaware Supreme Court. The first question was whether the
proposed Bylaw covered a proper subject for shareholder action
under Delaware law. Specifically, the SEC sought a determination of
the “scope or reach of the shareholders’ power to adopt, alter or
repeal the bylaws of a Delaware corporation” and whether the Bylaw
106
fell within that scope. The second question was whether the
adoption of the specific proposal would cause CA to violate Delaware
107
law.
B. The Court’s Holding and Unresolved Questions
The Delaware Supreme Court held that, although the proposal
108
covered an appropriate subject matter, CA could exclude the
proposed Bylaw because its adoption would violate Delaware law by
restricting the fiduciary duties of the board of directors to the
109
shareholders. The court first made clear that “[t]he shareholders of
a Delaware corporation have the right ‘to participate in selecting the
contestants’ for election to the board. The shareholders are entitled
to facilitate the exercise of that right by proposing a bylaw that would
encourage candidates other than board-sponsored nominees to stand
110
for election.” The court went to great lengths to illustrate that
decisions involving reimbursement affect director elections and not
simply corporate affairs, and thus do not deserve the same deference
111
usually given to directors under the business judgment rule. In
holding that the Bylaw was a proper subject for shareholder action,
the court noted that the “purpose of the Bylaw [was] to promote the
integrity of [the] electoral process by facilitating the nomination of
director candidates by stockholders,” thereby reiterating the positive

104. See Baldon, supra note 65, at 116–18 (discussing the steps taken by the SEC in
attempting to respond to CA’s request for a no-action letter).
105. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 230.
106. Id. at 231–32.
107. Id. at 231; see also Brett H. McDonnell, Bylaw Reforms for Delaware’s Corporation
Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 651, 663 (2008) (noting that the SEC certified these two questions).
108. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237.
109. Id. at 240.
110. Id. at 237 (quoting Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 311 (Del.
Ch. 2002)).
111. Id. at 234. For further discussion of business judgment deference, see infra Part IV.B.1.
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112

potential effects of the Bylaw’s underlying purpose. The court
viewed these potential effects as laudable, finding the proposed
Bylaw’s subject matter to be in accord with the court’s reverence for
the integrity of the election process.
The Delaware Supreme Court went out of its way to explain the
importance of the election process and the underlying necessity of
protecting shareholder participation in director elections through the
Bylaw in question. The court explained that because the Bylaw dealt
with the process of electing directors, it covered a subject matter in
113
which the shareholders had a legitimate and protected interest.
“The shareholders are entitled to facilitate the exercise of that right
by proposing a bylaw that would encourage candidates other than
board-sponsored nominees to stand for election,” which the Bylaw
114
would achieve.
Despite its apparent admiration for the intent of the Bylaw, the
115
court held that the Bylaw, as worded, violated Delaware law. The
Bylaw would have forced CA’s board to reimburse successful
dissident candidates even when the reimbursement would cause the
116
board to violate its fiduciary duties. The court hypothesized an
instance in which a dissident candidate is elected despite running for
117
purely personal reasons. This scenario is improbable given that
purely personal motivations are unlikely to command a majority of
118
shareholder votes. Still, the court was adamant about the need to
112. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237; see also Baldon, supra note 65, at 118 (noting that the court
held the Bylaw proper after its determination that the proposal was process related).
113. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237; see also Baldon, supra note 65, at 118 (reciting the ways in
which the court found the Bylaw process related).
114. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237.
115. Id. at 240.
116. See id. (“[T]he Bylaw mandates reimbursement of election expenses in circumstances
that a proper application of fiduciary principles could preclude. That such circumstances could
arise is not far fetched. Under Delaware law, a board may expend corporate funds to reimburse
proxy expenses ‘[w]here the controversy is concerned with a question of policy as distinguished
from personnel o[r] management.’ But in a situation in which the proxy contest is motivated by
personal or petty concerns, or to promote interests that do not further, or are adverse to, those
of the corporation, the board’s fiduciary duty could compel that reimbursement be denied
altogether.” (second and third alterations in original) (footnotes omitted)); see also Baldon,
supra note 65, at 119 (noting that “[t]he Court held that the board’s fiduciary duties outweighed
the merits of the proposed bylaw”).
117. CA., Inc., 953 A.2d at 240.
118. See Silvers & Garland, supra note 36, at 8 (“[I]t appears highly unlikely that in a widely
held company a nominee intent upon using his or her directorship to pursue an agenda at odds
with the interests of the corporation and its shareholders should be elected.”); see also Posting
of Lisa Fairfax to The Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/07/whats-next-for
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protect directors’ fiduciary duties without explicitly articulating the
119
type of clause that would assure those protections. The requirement
that the reimbursement be only for “reasonable” expenses was
insufficient because it only enabled the board to determine the
“amount of reimbursement [that] is appropriate” and did not
“reserve to CA’s directors their full power to exercise their fiduciary
duty to decide whether or not it would be appropriate . . . to award
120
reimbursement at all.” Thus, a situation may arise in which the
board’s duties to its shareholders would require it to refuse any
reimbursement, yet the Bylaw did not carve out this ability.
C. The Court Implies a Fiduciary-Out Clause Could Remedy
Its Concerns
Although the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the
proposed Bylaw could be excluded, it seemingly went out of its way
to indicate that the Bylaw might be permissible if it were amended in
certain ways, such as by changing its wording to reserve to directors
121
their full fiduciary duties. The court even concluded its opinion by
stating that, “[i]n arriving at this conclusion, [this Court] express[es]
no view on whether the Bylaw, as currently drafted, would create a
122
better governance scheme from a policy standpoint.” The court
limited its ruling by noting that the problems are with the Bylaw “as
written,” thus leaving open the possibility that amending the language
123
would be a sufficient remedy.

.html (July 21, 2008) (“[T]o the extent that a candidate (motivated by personal reasons) is
successful, can’t that somehow suggest that shareholders believe her service will benefit the
corporation? In this regard, it may prove difficult to determine when a candidacy is solely
personal . . . .”).
119. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 234 (“The question left unanswered is what is the scope of
[permissible] shareholder action that . . . does not improperly intrude upon the directors’ power
to manage corporation’s business and affairs. . . . To resolve that issue, the Court must resort to
different tools, namely, decisions of this Court and of the Court of Chancery that bear on this
question. Those tools do not enable us to articulate with doctrinal exactitude a bright line that
divides those bylaws that shareholders may unilaterally adopt . . . from those which they may
not.”).
120. Id. at 240 (emphasis omitted).
121. See id. (noting that the Bylaw, as presently drafted, is impermissible because it fails to
include a clause reserving directors’ right to exercise fiduciary duties); see also McDonnell,
supra note 107, at 664 (noting that the lack of a fiduciary out is damning to a shareholderproposed bylaw after CA, Inc.).
122. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240.
123. See id. (“It is in this respect that the proposed Bylaw, as written, would violate
Delaware law if enacted by CA’s shareholders.” (emphasis added)); see also Joseph Antignani,
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Early in the opinion, however, the court hints at the simplest
124
means to bring the Bylaw into compliance with Delaware law. In
footnote twenty, the court signaled that something like the inclusion
of a fiduciary-out clause might make the proposed Bylaw
125
acceptable.
This interpretation is underscored by the court’s
discussion later in the opinion about the potential dilemma that
would arise if a contested election were won by a challenger who ran
126
only out of personal motivations. A fiduciary-out clause would
reserve to directors the right to withhold reimbursement in instances
127
in which a candidate clearly ran for election for personal gain.
An important question the Delaware Supreme Court did not
answer was specifically how AFSCME could amend its proposal to
ensure that its adoption would not violate Delaware law. The court,
however, indicated a shortcoming in the proposed Bylaw, perhaps
pointing shareholders in the proper direction for future proposal
128
language. The next Part of this Note will explain how similar
proposals in the future can be constructed to meet the Delaware
Supreme Court’s requirements.

Note, Delaware to the Rescue: A Proper Exercise of Deference by the SEC and the Future
Implications of CA, Inc. v. AFSCME, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 431, 452 (2009)
(arguing that “it is true that a bylaw similar to the one AFSCME proposed (that contains a
fiduciary-out clause) is now valid”).
124. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 236 n.20 (noting that the process-related nature of the Bylaw
could be emphasized by changing the Bylaw’s language and including a clause that reserves to
directors the ability to exercise fiduciary duties).
125. See id. (“[T]he Bylaw could have been phrased more benignly . . . . [I]t would also need
to contain a provision that reserves the director’s full power to discharge their fiduciary
duties.”). Though the court does not specifically state that the fiduciary-out clause would be
sufficient to make the proposed Bylaw acceptable, the court’s opinion seems to indicate that the
only basis for allowing the company to exclude the proposal was the fact that the proposal
obligated directors to act, in some cases, contrary to their fiduciary duties to shareholders. See,
e.g., id. at 240 (approving the Bylaw’s exclusion “because the Bylaw contains no language or
provision that would reserve to CA’s directors their full power to exercise their fiduciary duty to
decide whether or not [reimbursement] would be appropriate, in a specific case”).
126. See id. at 239–40 (discussing the “not far fetched” possibility of a candidate running
solely for personal reasons).
127. See Antignani, supra note 123, at 452 (“[A] bylaw similar to the one AFSCME
proposed (that contains a fiduciary-out clause) is now valid.”). But see Posting of Lisa Fairfax to
The Conglomerate, supra note 118 (“[I]t seems that differentiating between campaigns that are
purely personal and those that are not may prove difficult.”).
128. For further discussion of the ways in which the inclusion of a fiduciary-out clause is
appropriate under Delaware law, see infra Part III.
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III. THE IMPLIED SOLUTION: A FIDUCIARY-OUT CLAUSE
In CA, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court signaled how future
shareholder bylaws dealing with the election process could satisfy the
court’s requirement for the protection of directors’ fiduciary duties.
Specifically, the court’s examples of problematic scenarios could all
be ameliorated by the inclusion of a fiduciary-out clause, which would
permit sufficient director flexibility in those rare instances in which a
bylaw would require actions inconsistent with a director’s fiduciary
duties to the company’s shareholders.
A. Fiduciary-Out Clauses: Current Usage and Judicial Treatment
A fiduciary-out clause is simply a means of reconciling certain
actions taken by a board of directors with its underlying obligation to
129
shareholders. Used primarily in the merger and acquisition context,
fiduciary outs are contract provisions that typically allow a target
corporation to renege on the performance of contractual obligations
when the board determines that such performance would violate the
130
board’s duties to shareholders. An issue arises when an otherwise
acceptable board or shareholder action binds the board and prevents
131
it from discharging its fiduciary duties down the line. In the merger
context, fiduciary-out clauses were the product of courts requiring
boards to invalidate no-shop provisions—which prevented companies
from seeking better offers once they had engaged in negotiations with
a buyer—and other exclusivity agreements in the event of the

129. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938–39 (Del. 2003)
(explaining that fiduciary-out clauses prevent a board from binding itself to actions that may be
to the detriment of shareholders). For a general discussion of the role of fiduciary-out clauses in
the merger and acquisition context, in which they are used to protect directors’ ability to breach
an agreement when breaching is in the best interest of shareholders, see generally William T.
Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and Why of an Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS.
LAW. 653 (2000).
130. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 129, at 656 (noting the ability of boards to contract around
the normal costs of efficient breach because of such provisions); David B. Chubak, Note,
Locking in the Lock-Up? Orman v. Cullman & Corporate Deal Protection Measures, 1 N.Y.U.
J.L. & BUS. 457, 465 n.47 (2005) (“A fiduciary-out clause has its basis in the restrictions placed
on fiduciaries so that they are not induced into violating their duty to beneficiaries. The section
heading states: ‘A promise by a fiduciary to violate his fiduciary duty or a promise that tends to
induce such a violation is unenforceable on grounds of public policy.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 193 (2005))).
131. See Allen, supra note 129, at 656 (discussing the importance and operation of fiduciaryout clauses in these situations).
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inevitable sale of the company. In the context of shareholderproposed bylaws, fiduciary-out clauses have never been used before.
The Delaware Supreme Court discussed the nature and
importance of fiduciary-out clauses in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS
133
Healthcare, Inc., explaining the difficulties in balancing a director’s
fiduciary duties and his ability to cede decisionmaking power through
134
certain agreements. In Omnicare, the court held that a fiduciary-out
clause needed to be included in the agreement between the acquiring
company and the target corporation to protect minority shareholders
in the event that the board of the target corporation received a
135
superior offer. The board of directors’ omission of such a clause
thereby invalidated its attempts to create an agreement with a
136
company that had proposed a merger. In the court’s view, a
fiduciary-out clause was a necessary part of the merger agreement and
the accompanying deal protections the board had chosen to provide
137
its initial suitor. The court’s insistence on the inclusion of a fiduciary
out is based on the board’s “continuing fiduciary responsibilities to
138
the minority stockholders.” The contractual expectations of the
merging company “must yield to the supervening responsibility of the
139
directors to discharge their fiduciary duties on a continuing basis.”
By analogy, if the Delaware Supreme Court found it necessary to
include a fiduciary out in instances in which the board and the
majority voting shareholders obtained a lock-up, it makes sense that
the court would seek to ensure equal protection of minority
shareholders in the event that a candidate’s election was not in the
best interests of the company. In Omnicare, the majority’s sentiments
seem to indicate that fiduciary outs will be a future requirement for

132. See, e.g., Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 938 (describing the requirement for fiduciary-out
clauses to prevent a board “from effectively discharging its ongoing fiduciary responsibilities”).
133. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
134. See id. at 936–39 (concluding that the board could not simply abdicate its fiduciary
duties and depend on a shareholder vote in light of the fact that the vote’s outcome was a
foregone conclusion).
135. Id. at 936 (“To the extent that a [merger] contract, or a provision thereof, purports to
require a board to act or not act in such a fashion as to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, it is
invalid and unenforceable.” (alteration in original) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1993))).
136. Id. at 939.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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actions that uniformly constrain a board’s judgment. This makes it
more likely that a fiduciary out in a proposal similar to the Bylaw in
CA, Inc. would satisfy the court’s concern that board discretion has
been unduly or at least automatically eliminated.
B. When Including Fiduciary-Out Clauses Makes Sense
Including a fiduciary-out clause to protect shareholders makes
sense when the clause is in place to prevent boards from binding
themselves to the detriment of shareholders. Although a fiduciary-out
clause is a proper protection to ensure that a board can always
exercise its obligations to shareholders, such a clause should not be
141
seen as a restriction on shareholder action. It is important to note
that the discussion of fiduciary duties involved in a potential
shareholder bylaw proposal is inherently different than the role of
fiduciary duties in a takeover context. As the Delaware Court of
142
Chancery noted in Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., fiduciary duties to
shareholders should not be used as a defense to mute shareholder
143
proposals and nominations. The logic is that fiduciary duties exist to
ensure that directors act in the interests of shareholders. Underlying
that assumption, however, is the notion that shareholders cannot
always specify the course of action they desire. When, as in instances
of a shareholder vote, the shareholders demonstrate their specific
desire, it no longer makes sense to allow a board to argue that its
fiduciary duties to those shareholders prevent it from following their
144
vote. Thus, when a bylaw is supported by a majority of shareholders

140. See id. at 945–46 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (raising the possibility that the inclusion of
fiduciary outs may become a more uniform rule in instances limiting director discretion).
141. See Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317, at *8 (Del. Ch. Dec.
20, 2005) (stating that the use of fiduciary-out clauses as a restriction on shareholder action
“misconceives the nature and purpose of fiduciary duties”).
142. Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005).
143. See id. at *8 (explaining that, after shareholders have expressly voiced their desires,
there is no longer a need for the gap-filling of fiduciary duties).
144. See, e.g., id. (“Fiduciary duties exist in order to fill the gaps in the contractual
relationship between the shareholders and directors of the corporation. Fiduciary duties cannot
be used to silence shareholders and prevent them from specifying what the corporate contract is
to say. Shareholders should be permitted to fill a particular gap in the corporate contract if they
wish to fill it. This point can be made by reference to principles of agency law: Agents
frequently have to act in situations in which they do not know exactly how their principal would
like them to act. In such situations, the law says the agent must act in the best interests of the
principal. When the principal wishes to make known to the agent exactly which actions the
principal wishes to be taken, the agent cannot refuse to listen on the grounds that this is not in
the best interests of the principal.” (footnotes omitted)).
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and a vote has been cast by a majority of shareholders in favor of a
particular candidate, courts should be reluctant to allow the specific
demonstration of shareholder preference to be undermined or
contradicted by the board of directors’ attempt to utilize a fiduciaryout clause. To allow liberal use of a fiduciary-out clause would be to
turn the clause against those it was meant to protect.
Because future proposals are likely to heed the Delaware
145
Supreme Court’s advice and include fiduciary-out clauses, the next
step in the analysis is to choose an appropriate standard of review.
The standard that courts use to review board actions when invoking
fiduciary-out clauses ultimately will dictate the effect those clauses
have. The next Part of this Note will explain why a Blasius standard
of review, a stringent standard, is necessary to protect the rights of
shareholders recognized by the court in CA, Inc.
IV. ADVOCATING AN APPROPRIATELY STRICT
STANDARD OF REVIEW
If shareholders include fiduciary-out clauses in future bylaw
proposals regarding election reimbursement, courts must be wary
when directors seek to exercise discretion in using those clauses to
146
block reimbursement. The inclusion of a fiduciary-out clause has
the potential to make a shareholder-proposed bylaw useless if a board

145. See McDonnell, supra note 107, at 668 (noting that one solution to the problem noted
in CA, Inc. “is for shareholders to include fiduciary duty outs in all bylaw proposals that are
potentially subject to this objection (which may well be all bylaw proposals, period)”); see also
Office Depot, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 264, at *1 (Mar. 9, 2009)
(refusing to concur with the exclusion of a shareholder-proposed bylaw that included a
fiduciary-out provision and was otherwise almost identical to the one proposed by AFSCME).
146. See McDonnell, supra note 107, at 668 (noting that the addition of fiduciary-out clauses
to bylaws “leaves boards with a degree of discretion that may go against the very point of these
bylaws, which seek to limit board discretion in areas in which the shareholders do not trust the
board”); see also 1 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 18:26.20 (2008)
(observing that “[a] fiduciary-out clause grants the board broad authority, but presumably
permits the proponents [of the candidate] an avenue to challenge whether the board breached
its fiduciary duties” when it exercised the fiduciary-out clause). In fact, Professor McDonnell
has argued that this potential for directors to abuse any ability to amend or reject shareholder
bylaws necessitates the elimination of director fiduciary duties with respect to such bylaws.
McDonnell, supra note 107, at 669. But the elimination of fiduciary duties, which is McDonnell’s
suggested fix, would not be necessary if courts invoke a strict standard to scrutinize any director
interference with such bylaws.
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has discretion in exercising its fiduciary out. The Blasius standard of
review, reserved for instances in which the board of directors
interferes directly with the election process for directors, is the proper
standard for judging directors’ invocation of a fiduciary-out clause in
the reimbursement context.
A. Why the Judicial Standard of Review Matters
If shareholders follow the breadcrumbs left by the Delaware
Supreme Court, future proposals will include fiduciary-out clauses to
reserve some power to directors, making it more likely that a bylaw
will not violate Delaware law by invalidating the directors’ fiduciary
148
obligations to the shareholders. This would be a significant step
toward greater shareholder participation, but the inclusion of
fiduciary-out clauses could render the laudable purpose of the
149
proposed Bylaw moot. Future cases will likely force Delaware
courts to determine a standard of review for the exercise of these
150
fiduciary outs, and as the Delaware Supreme Court has itself noted,

147. See Antignani, supra note 123, at 452–53 (arguing that “a fiduciary-out clause makes
the mandatory reimbursement provision useless” in the event that such clauses lead to
protracted litigation and the real possibility that expenses will not be reimbursed).
148. See, e.g., Office Depot, Inc., supra note 145, at *1–2 (discussing a shareholder proposal
that echoed the CA, Inc. proposal but included the language “consistent with its fiduciary
duties” to provide the board with the necessary fiduciary out). The SEC concluded that Office
Depot could not exclude the proposal. Id. at *1. As is the SEC’s convention, it did not elaborate
on the legal reasoning behind its decision; however, the attached correspondence from the
parties demonstrates that the parties believed that the holding of CA, Inc. would determine the
SEC’s decision. See id. at *15 (“Both [AFSCME’s] and Office Depot’s lawyers acknowledge
that the legality of the proposed bylaw is resolved under [CA, Inc.]. Office Depot’s only
complaint is that, in its opinion and the opinion of its counsel, the ‘fiduciary out’ provided in
[AFSCME’s] proposed bylaw somehow is not good enough to satisfy the requirements set forth
in the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision.”).
149. See Posting by Lisa Fairfax to The Conglomerate, supra note 118 (noting the
“possibility that [the inclusion of a fiduciary out] would enable directors to challenge the
payment of expenses for every successful candidate, thereby defeating shareholders’ purpose in
adopting the bylaw”); see also McDonnell, supra note 107, at 668 (concluding that if fiduciary
outs are required in all proposed bylaws, the result “leaves boards with a degree of discretion
that may go against the very point of these bylaws, which seek to limit board discretion in areas
in which the shareholders do not trust the board”).
150. See McDonnell, supra note 107, at 668 (noting that “[o]ne fix [to the deficiency of the
CA Bylaw] is for shareholders to include fiduciary duty outs in all bylaw proposals”); see also
Posting by Lisa Fairfax to The Conglomerate, supra note 118 (arguing that the potential for
protracted litigation over reimbursement might also be a deterrent for those who would
otherwise nominate directors).
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this determination is critical. The inclusion of fiduciary-out clauses
does not make proposals useless as long as courts subject directors’
use of such fiduciary outs to a strict standard of review.
Imagine that AFSCME had included the following fiduciary-out
clause in the Bylaw: “Reimbursement is mandatory to the extent that
152
the reimbursement is consistent with the directors’ fiduciary duties.”
This clause would have muted the Delaware Supreme Court’s
153
primary concern, presumably smoothing the way for including the
shareholder proposal in the company’s proxy materials and
presenting it to the shareholders for a vote. But it is likely that, given
the directors’ resistance to the inclusion of these bylaws and similar
proposals in the first place, the directors will desire to prevent the
inclusion of future bylaws and the exercise of the powers contained
154
therein. Thus, the board of directors could use the fiduciary-out
155
clause as a veto, simply refusing to reimburse the “short slate”
candidates for the previous contest. This would not only defeat the
purpose of the bylaw by making the contests just as expensive for

151. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003) (“[I]dentification
of the correct analytical framework is essential to a proper judicial review of challenges to the
decision-making process of a corporation’s board of directors.”); see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am.
Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1371 (Del. 1995) (noting that because of the distinction between the
leniency of business judgment deference and the exacting nature of heightened forms of
scrutiny, “the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is
determinative of the outcome of [the] litigation” (alteration in original) (quoting Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989))).
152. This language mirrors the language included by shareholders of Office Depot in a
proposed bylaw after the CA, Inc. opinion. See Office Depot, Inc., supra note 145, at *1–2
(noting that a proposed bylaw that modifies the reimbursement requirement with the clause
“consistent with its fiduciary duties” could not be excluded).
153. Indeed, even when Office Depot attempted to reject the addition of a shareholder
bylaw that allowed for reimbursement, the company still acknowledged that the proposal would
be permissible with a proper fiduciary-out clause. See id. at *5–6 (containing Office Depot’s
argument that the proposal “does not clearly and unambiguously provide a fiduciary out as
required by the Delaware Supreme Court”).
154. See Posting by Lisa Fairfax to The Conglomerate, supra note 118 (discussing the
likelihood that the board would utilize the fiduciary-out clause to oppose shareholder
nominees); see also supra note 103 and accompanying text. As further evidence of the reticence
of boards of directors to accept shareholder-proposed bylaws, one can simply review the
massive number of no-action letters in which the SEC declines to allow a proposal’s exclusion.
See, e.g., Syms Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 324 (Apr. 17, 2009);
Exxon Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 608 (Mar. 23, 2009);
Office Depot, Inc., supra note 145; The Boeing Company, SEC No-Action Letter, 2009 SEC
No-Act. LEXIS 156 (Feb. 18, 2009).
155. Short slate candidates are candidates on a slate that covers “less than half of the
positions to be contested in the election.” McDonnell, supra note 107, at 662.
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dissident shareholders, but it would also discourage contested
elections generally by signaling to future dissident shareholders that
there is no chance of reimbursement for waging a proxy contest
challenging incumbent directors.
The first question is whether this problem is likely to occur. Is a
board of directors likely to oppose the reimbursement of
expenditures made on behalf of the dissident slate? Comments by
board members and lobbying groups for business management, such
as the Business Roundtable, indicate that “boards are congenial and
unified entities that would be harmed by the expression of contrary
156
views” and that “boards are likely to oppose the replacement of any
157
of their members with ‘outsiders.’”
This sentiment would
presumably extend to dissident candidates, whose candidacy directors
could discourage by refusing to reimburse those who are successful.
Indeed, evidence of directors’ opposition to any new members and to
the ability of shareholders to nominate directors can be found in the
multitude of SEC no-action letters sought by boards in response to
158
proposals after the CA, Inc. opinion. There is a very real likelihood
that, given their incentives, incumbent directors would choose not to
reimburse dissident candidates whenever possible. As one scholar
noted in response to the CA, Inc. decision,
[v]irtually all bylaws limit board discretion in some way, and with
some creativity one should almost always be able to come up with
circumstances where doing what the bylaw requires would force the
board to act in a way that violates its duty if it had discretion to act
159
as it chose.

Thus, quite possibly, the inclusion of a fiduciary-out clause could
160
undermine the purpose of the proposed Bylaw in the first place.

156. Robert J. Klein, Note, The Case for Heightened Scrutiny in Defense of the Shareholders’
Franchise Right, 44 STAN L. REV. 129, 130 (1991).
157. Id. (“Incumbent directors of many corporations think that they know best . . . who
should comprise the board of directors.”).
158. See, e.g., Office Depot, Inc., supra note 145, at *1 (informing Office Depot that the SEC
would not “express any view regarding the applicability of rule 14a-8” to AFSCME’s proposed
amendment to the company’s bylaws).
159. McDonnell, supra note 107, at 664.
160. See Posting by Lisa Fairfax to The Conglomerate, supra note 118 (noting the
“possibility that [the inclusion of a fiduciary out] would enable directors to challenge the
payment of expenses for every successful candidate, thereby defeating shareholders’ purpose in
adopting the bylaw”).
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It is also important to establish that the court’s decision in CA,
Inc. attributed significant importance to the shareholders’ rights to
participate in the nomination of director candidates, evident in the
extent to which the opinion lauded the shareholder franchise and the
foundational role it plays in corporate law. The court stated:
[T]he unadorned right to cast a ballot in a contest for [corporate]
office . . . is meaningless without the right to participate in selecting
the contestants. As the nominating process circumscribes the range
of choice to be made, it is a fundamental and outcomedeterminative step in the election of officeholders. To allow for
voting while maintaining a closed selection process thus renders the
161
former an empty exercise.

The court noted that this “unadorned right” becomes worthless if the
shareholders cannot meaningfully participate in the nomination of
162
candidates.
It follows logically, then, that the court should
discourage actions that limit the ability of shareholders to participate
in contested director elections, thereby making their right to vote
meaningless.
But the court should go one step further. If protecting the
163
selection of candidates is fundamental, as the court granted, and the
inclusion of a fiduciary-out clause is necessary to comply with
164
Delaware law, as the court implied, then the court must use a
particularly strict standard to review a board’s exercise of discretion
with respect to the use of that fiduciary-out clause.
B. Blasius’s Stricter Standard of Scrutiny Is Preferable to More
Deferential Standards
As explained, a weaker standard of scrutiny when board actions
directly impede shareholder actions is improper. Invoking a stricter
standard of review for director actions is not novel. Delaware courts
generally apply one of three broad standards of review: a “deferential
review under the business judgment rule,” an “intermediate scrutiny
applying a reasonableness analysis,” and the heightened compelling

161. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008) (quoting
Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 311 (Del. Ch. 2002)).
162. See id. (noting that the process is meaningless if it does not allow for shareholder
participation in the selection of candidates for the board of directors).
163. See supra Part II.B.
164. See supra Part II.C.
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justification review of Blasius. Scholars have discussed the proper
standard of review when a board of directors attempts to interfere
166
with the shareholders’ role in a proxy contest, and some scholars
have advocated a stricter standard when a board of directors acts in a
167
manner that inhibits shareholders from undertaking a proxy contest.
When a proposal deals not only with the proxy contest but also with
the director-election process itself, there is even greater need for a
168
stricter standard of review. Business judgment deference and even
some heightened standards of review are not sufficient when
reviewing director decisions to reject reimbursement. Only the
Blasius standard of review provides sufficient protections to the
shareholder franchise by requiring a compelling justification before a
board of directors can interfere in a shareholder vote or bylaw.
1. Business Judgment Deference. In most circumstances, director
169
decisions receive business judgment deference. Under the business
170
deference rule articulated in Kamin v. American Express Co., courts
refuse to second-guess the decisionmaking of boards when a board is
171
carrying out its ordinary business decisions.
To encourage
reasonable risk-taking on the part of directors, courts are loathe to
165. MICHAEL B. TUMAS & MICHAEL K. KELLY, POTTER, ANDERSON, & CORROON LLP,
RETHINKING THE BLASIUS STANDARD OF REVIEW: THE IMPLICATIONS OF MERCIER V. INTERTEL (DELAWARE), INC. 2 (2008), available at http://www.potteranderson.com/assets/
attachments/Rethinking_the_Blasius_Standard_of_Reveiw.pdf [sic].
166. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, Judicial Review of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests:
When Is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REV. 503, 557–60 (1993) (addressing what
standard of review should be used when incumbent boards attempt to use rights plans to the
potential detriment of a dissident election campaign); Warren & Abrams, supra note 34, at 652–
63 (discussing the importance of Blasius as it may interact with Unocal and other cases in
reviewing defensive measures that have the effect of shareholder disenfranchisement).
167. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 166, at 559 (arguing that a board’s use of defensive tactics
should receive stricter review when, in particular, such tactics “interfere[] with a shareholder
group’s ability to communicate with other shareholders or with other important voting rights,
such as the right to nominate candidates”).
168. For further argument on this point, see infra Part IV.C.
169. See, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 815 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding
that, absent bad faith, stockholders may not question a board of directors’ exercise of its
discretion when the board is carrying out ordinary business decisions, such as declaring
dividends); see also Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927–28 (Del. 2003)
(noting that “[t]he business judgment rule is a ‘presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company’” (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am.
Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995))).
170. Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
171. Id. at 812.
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interfere with business decisions absent a showing of bad faith. The
business judgment rule underlies a central tenet of Delaware
corporate law: the need to trust directors generally. Thus, business
judgment deference is the default standard under which the Delaware
courts review the decisions of the board of directors in managing the
173
company’s affairs. This standard makes sense because so much of
Delaware corporate law is premised on the notion that managers are
bound by their fiduciary duties to shareholders but otherwise must be
174
free to act as they see fit. This standard is incredibly lenient and, as
this Note explains, would be an inappropriately permissive standard
of review for director actions that interfere with the election process.
2. Intermediate and Heightened Scrutiny. Delaware courts have
determined that, in certain circumstances, business judgment
175
deference should not be granted. In circumstances in which the
action of the board of directors involves potential or inherent
conflicts of interest, like a decision to reject a tender offer that would
176
cost the directors their jobs, a higher level of scrutiny is warranted.
Thus, the Delaware courts enforce “an enhanced duty which calls for
judicial examination at the threshold before protections of the
177
business judgment rule” apply. Courts use this enhanced scrutiny
because conflicted directors who stand to gain disproportionately
from their own decision bring with them the “omnipresent specter
that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than

172. See id. at 812–13 (stating the court’s reluctance to interfere with a board’s management
absent a showing of dishonesty, lest it deter the appropriate exercise of board discretion).
173. For an in-depth discussion of the business judgment rule and a comparison with
heightened forms of scrutiny in general, see Klein, supra note 156, at 147–57. “The primary
rationale for the business judgment rule is that courts are ill suited to review and evaluate the
wisdom of complex business decisions.” Id. at 148.
174. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 232 n.6 (Del. 2008)
(“One of the most basic tenets of Delaware corporate law is that the board of directors has the
ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation.” (quoting
Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291–92 (Del. 1998)). See generally
EISENBERG, supra note 15, at 539–41 (discussing the interrelation between the standards of
conduct and standards of review in corporate law).
175. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (“The requirement of
fairness is unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has
the burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the
courts.”).
176. Id.
177. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
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those of the corporation and its shareholders.” There are three key
forms of increased scrutiny available to Delaware courts when
179
reviewing board actions that appear detrimental to shareholders;
these standards of review vary from an intermediate level of scrutiny
to an extremely heightened scrutiny. The court identified the
standards in three landmark cases: Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum,
180
181
Co., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., and Blasius. These standards of
review must be distinguished to explain why the Blasius standard is
appropriate in the context of fiduciary-out clauses.
Neither the Weinberger nor the Unocal standard is compatible
with the scenario posed by a board of directors’ abuse of its fiduciaryout clause. Unocal review requires a board of directors that has
decided to take defensive measures against a takeover to show that it
had, with good faith and upon appropriate investigation, a belief that
the takeover posed a threat to the corporation; the board’s action
182
must then be “reasonable in relation to the threat posed.” The
majority of the Unocal analysis, however, focuses on the threat of a
183
takeover, an element not present in the shareholder-bylaw proposal
and director-election contexts. The proposed Bylaw simply attempts
to institute a process through which successful candidates are
184
reimbursed. This change would have the effect of increasing the
likelihood of contested elections, but it would not create a threat that
185
Likewise, the typical deal
should trigger a Unocal analysis.

178. Id.
179. Compare Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding
the board to a burden of demonstrating a compelling justification for actions with the “purpose
of impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power”), with Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954–55
(explaining that conflicted directors have the burden of showing that their actions were taken in
good faith with no desire to perpetuate themselves in office and were “reasonable in relation to
the threat posed”), and Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711 (requiring a showing of “[t]he concept of
fairness [with] two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price”). For a detailed discussion of the
Unocal, Weinberger, and Blasius standards and their varying levels of heightened scrutiny, see
Klein, supra note 156, at 147–57.
180. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
181. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
182. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
183. See, e.g., Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1996) (“A Unocal analysis should
be used only when a board . . . adopts defensive measures in reaction to a perceived threat.”).
184. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 230 (Del. 2008).
185. Recall that Unocal analysis is triggered by the threat of a takeover and the use of
defensive measures by the board in response to that threat. See, e.g., Williams, 671 A.2d at 1377
(noting that a Unocal analysis only applies in the context of a board’s adoption of defensive
measures against a perceived threat to the corporate enterprise).
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protections and defensive measures utilized by a board of directors
186
would have little effect after an election. The Unocal standard is, of
course, a higher standard than the business judgment rule, but the
Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that the Blasius standard
applies
more
specifically
to
instances
of
shareholder
187
disenfranchisement.
The entire fairness test from Weinberger requires a showing of
both a fair price in a given transaction and fair dealing or process in
188
undertaking that transaction. However, the entire fairness standard
189
is not relevant to the corporate governance context, as there is no
transaction or price to take into account. Although the entire fairness
test provides heightened scrutiny, it has rarely been utilized outside
the takeover context. The situation that this Note addresses would
take place after a shareholder vote to accept the proposed bylaw and
after a short slate candidate is successfully voted onto the board.
Defensive measures at that point would be completely out of place, as
would a standard of review meant to deal with them. Instead,
attempts by the incumbent board to undermine the election of an
individual to the board would be unilateral, unprovoked actions with
the taint of both entrenchment and shareholder disenfranchisement.
Such actions would necessitate a Blasius standard of review.
The Blasius standard places upon the board “the heavy burden
of demonstrating a compelling justification” for the board action that
190
impeded shareholder voting power. To invoke Blasius, “[t]he
franchise interest [of shareholders] should clearly be in jeopardy
191
before a court grants it special protection.” The board’s action
186. Typical deal protections, such as no-shop provisions, or defensive measures, such as
shareholder rights plans for repurchasing shares, simply would have no bearing on the
reimbursement of a candidate. Such measures—and an analysis of such measures—are more
appropriate in the context in which a proxy contest is waged simultaneous to a tender offer. For
further discussion, see Warren & Abrams, supra note 34, at 652–53, discussing the general
framework as applied in Unocal, and Klein, supra note 156, at 149–50, addressing the Unocal
court’s standard of review to determine the reasonableness of board action.
187. See Williams, 671 A.2d at 1376 (“[T]he . . . standard set forth in Blasius is appropriate
only where the ‘“primary purpose’ of the board’s action [is] to interfere with or impede exercise
of the shareholder franchise . . . .’” (third alteration in original) (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606
A.2d 75, 93 (Del. 1992))); see also id. at 1377 (distinguishing between “either unilateral director
action in the face of a claimed threat or an act of disenfranchisement” (emphasis omitted)).
188. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
189. See Klein, supra note 156, at 148 (noting that in the 1980s, with the market for
corporate control developing, the entire fairness standard of review became “unsatisfactory”).
190. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988).
191. Klein, supra note 156, at 156.
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should come close to “foreclosing effective shareholder action.”
Chancellor Allen explains his rationale for utilizing a higher degree of
scrutiny in such instances, stating:
[T]he ordinary considerations to which the business judgment rule
originally responded are simply not present in the shareholder
voting context. That is, a decision by the board to act for the primary
purpose of preventing the effectiveness of a shareholder vote
inevitably involves the question who, as between the principal and
the agent, has authority with respect to a matter of internal
corporate governance. . . . Action designed principally to interfere
with the effectiveness of a vote inevitably involves a conflict
between the board and a shareholder majority. Judicial review of
such action involves a determination of the legal and equitable
obligations of an agent towards his principal. This is not . . . a
question that a court may leave to the agent finally to decide so long
as he does so honestly and competently; that is, it may not be left to
193
the agent’s business judgment.

Admittedly, “Blasius’ burden of demonstrating a ‘compelling
justification’ is quite onerous” and should therefore be “applied
194
rarely.” Courts have articulated that Blasius’ onerous standard is
appropriate only when the “‘purpose of the board’s action [is] to
interfere with or impede exercise of the shareholder franchise,’ and
195
the stockholders are not given a ‘full and fair opportunity to vote.’”
C. Blasius Review Should Be Used when Directors Discourage
Contested Elections
Delaware courts have noted previously that “[t]he corporate
election process, if it is to have any validity, must be conducted with
scrupulous fairness and without any advantage being conferred or
196
denied to any candidate or slate of candidates.” Delaware courts
require that “those in charge of the election machinery of a
corporation must be held to the highest standards in providing for
197
and conducting corporate elections.” A board’s decision to refuse
192. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663.
193. Id. at 659–60 (footnotes omitted).
194. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996). But see Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore,
771 A.2d 293, 320 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“[T]he fact that [Blasius] is ‘onerous’ is not a reason not to
apply it if the circumstances warrant.”).
195. Williams, 671 A.2d at 1376 (quoting Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 (Del. 1992)).
196. Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1206 (Del. Ch. 1987).
197. Id. at 1206–07.
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reimbursement would inherently subordinate the dissident slate; it
would effectively signal the incumbent board’s commitment to
oppose any attempt to facilitate more competitive and responsive
director elections.
As the court in Blasius noted, “[t]he only justification that
can . . . be offered for [such a board] action is that the board knows
better than do the shareholders what is in the corporation’s best
198
interest.” The court continued, however, by arguing that “[w]hile
that premise is no doubt true for any number of matters, it is
199
irrelevant . . . when the question is who should comprise the board.”
200
The Delaware Supreme Court has since adopted this very logic. A
board of directors should not be permitted to assert that it knows
better than the shareholders—the proper electorate—whom that
electorate should choose as its directors. Such an assertion, given
201
Chancellor Allen’s logic in Blasius, should necessarily invoke the
Blasius compelling justification requirement. Because the Delaware
Supreme Court defined the right to choose contestants as part of the
202
shareholders’ right to vote for directors, it follows that an action
taken to undermine the nomination of future directors has the
purpose and effect of impeding the exercise of the shareholder
franchise. When a board impedes the shareholder franchise, Blasius
review is appropriate.
The decision by a board to refuse reimbursement to the
nominating party of a successful dissident candidate is not a typical
business decision. Instead, it is inherently tied to the election process.
The Blasius standard is more likely to be applied to decisions outside
203
of the ordinary business decisions of the board. Thus, a decision that
has the effect of limiting or preventing a portion of shareholder
voting likely deserves the protection of the Blasius standard of

198. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663.
199. Id.
200. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1128–29 (Del. 2003) (quoting in
multiple places Chancellor Allen’s opinion in Blasius).
201. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663 (“The theory of our corporation law confers power upon
directors as the agents of the shareholders; it does not create Platonic masters.”).
202. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008).
203. David C. McBride & Danielle Gibbs, Interference with Voting Rights: The Metaphysics
of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 927, 935 (2001).
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review; the detrimental effect, though perhaps not imminent, is
204
nonetheless guaranteed.
When assessing whether a Blasius standard of review is
appropriate, one must demonstrate that not only the purpose but also
the effect of the action was to the detriment of the shareholder
205
franchise. Succinctly put, did the action thwart a shareholder
206
vote? One may argue that a Blasius standard is inappropriate when,
as here, the board’s action did not interfere with the vote itself;
likewise, one could argue that discouraging future elections does not
amount to discouraging an imminent contest and therefore does not
trigger Blasius. Indeed, CA argued that the fact that the proposed
Bylaw dealt with corporate funds and would have its effect after the
election in essence removed it from the spectrum of shareholder
207
enfranchisement, and thus was outside proper shareholder action.
Such arguments, however, ignore the fact that the refusal to
reimburse candidates inherently undermines the vote, thus interfering
208
with the voting process going forward.
Another potential criticism of the invocation of the Blasius
standard is that the Unocal standard, or simply a balancing or entire
fairness test, would be sufficient. In other words, the courts need not
204. See Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 320 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Absent
confessions of improper purpose, the most important evidence of what a board intended to do is
often what effects its actions have.”).
205. See McBride & Gibbs, supra note 203, at 930 (“When assessing whether the Blasius
standard applies to an individual case, lawyers are often consumed by the question of the
defendant’s motive or purpose. They sometimes fail to appreciate that courts make an equally
important inquiry into whether the defendant’s action, whatever its purpose, had the proscribed
effect.”).
206. Id.
207. See Broc Romanek, The Delaware Supreme Court’s AFSCME/CA Hearing: All the
News Fit to Post, THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET, July 10, 2008, http://www.thecorporate
counsel.net/Blog/2008/07/the-delaware-supreme-courts-afscmeca-hearing-all-the-news-fit-topost.html (noting CA’s argument that the “Bylaw mandates a payment of expenses, rather than
relates to an election, and control over corporate expenditures is part of the business and affairs
of the corporation”). Compare Brief of Appellant at 18, CA, Inc., 953 A.2d 227 (No. 329,2008),
2008 WL 2724909, at *15 (“It does not matter that the expenditures nominally concern
stockholder voting, rather than other aspects of a company’s business operations . . . .”), with
Brief of Appellee at 12–13, CA, Inc., 953 A.2d 227 (No. 329,2008), 2008 WL 2724908, at *10
(“Because the nomination process is an integral element of the shareholder franchise, the
Proposed Bylaw addresses an area that is an appropriate subject matter for shareholder
action.”).
208. See McBride & Gibbs, supra note 203, at 931 (“Such selective and one-sided use of
[director] power, if permitted, would fundamentally undermine the process of shareholder
voting. In addition, a one-sided voting process would surely deter any proxy contestant and
undermine the institutional integrity of corporate democracy.”).
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utilize Blasius because its strict standard is unnecessary given Unocal
and Weinberger. This criticism, however, misses the point of Blasius.
As one study found, “despite the considerable overlap between the
Blasius standard and [other standards], the Blasius standard serves a
209
purpose not served by [the others].” Blasius is the only standard of
review that recognizes that certain decisions should not qualify as
business decisions, and that therefore adopts a sufficiently strict
approach to protecting against threats to the shareholder franchise,
210
the bedrock of Delaware corporate law.
Likewise, a company could assert that, when the shareholders
have already successfully voted for a dissident candidate, it is logically
inconsistent to then argue that the board could interfere with the
exercise of that vote after the fact. To invoke Blasius, however, the
Delaware Supreme Court has held that “a board need not actually
prevent the shareholders from attaining any success in seating one or
more nominees,” nor does the contested election need to “involve a
211
challenge for outright control of the board.” Moreover, such an
argument ignores the importance of reimbursement as part of the
voting process going forward; reimbursement facilitates shareholders’
212
rights to participate in the selection of candidates. By discouraging
future contested elections, the board of directors would inherently
213
“impede [the] exercise of the shareholder franchise.” The Delaware
Supreme Court specifically recognized shareholders’ right to choose
contestants in an election and noted shareholders’ entitlement to
214
encourage the candidacy of nonboard-sponsored nominees. By
doing so, the court inherently supported the notion that actions with
209. Id. at 929; see also id. (assessing the Blasius doctrine’s usefulness).
210. See id. at 944 (noting that Blasius applies in circumstances in which Unocal cannot and
is particularly suited for the conflicts raised by corporate elections).
211. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1132 (Del. 2003).
212. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237 (noting that the Bylaw facilitates shareholders’ rights to
participate in director nominations); see also Posting of Lisa Fairfax to The Conglomerate,
supra note 118 (noting that the potential for costly litigation would be a deterrent for those
considering nominating candidates, ultimately undermining the purpose of the Bylaw).
213. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996); see also id. (noting that Blasius is
invoked when the board’s actions limit the shareholder franchise and shareholders’ ability to
freely and fully vote). This Note asserts that, by discouraging future candidates from
campaigning for a board position, the incumbent board interferes with the shareholders’ ability
to freely and fully vote insofar as the Delaware Supreme Court understands the right to vote to
include the ability to choose the contestants for that election. For a discussion of the
meaninglessness of a shareholder’s right to vote without the ability to choose the contestants for
that election, see supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
214. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 237.
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the effect of suppressing shareholders’ efforts to encourage alternate
candidates would, in effect, thwart the proper exercise of the
shareholder franchise by undermining a right that the court
215
specifically delineated.
Another potential criticism of the invocation of the compelling
justification standard is that strict scrutiny assumes that the board
216
acted with the purpose of disenfranchisement. One could argue that
a board that chooses to reject reimbursement does so in good faith
and with no specific intent to discourage future contested elections.
But it is important to note that, although the Blasius standard has
only been applied when a given motive is present, it does not require
that the directors be acting in bad faith or to the detriment of the
217
shareholders. Indeed, in Blasius, the good faith belief of the board
was not enough to cure the improper purpose to interfere with the
218
shareholder voting process.
Given the directors’ knowledge of the effects of their decision, it
is fair to assume that, without compelling justification, the board’s
219
intent is to discourage dissident candidates. Logically, if the

215. If the Delaware Supreme Court is not willing to prevent actions that discourage
contested election and director nominations, then the importance the court placed on
shareholders’ rights to choose contestants in an election is undermined. It makes little sense for
the court to praise the shareholder franchise with respect to candidate nominations while
simultaneously refusing to defend the right to protect those nominations from attack.
216. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that
compelling justification review is appropriate when the “board acts . . . for the primary purpose
of impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power”).
217. See id. at 658, 663 (discussing whether a board that acts in good faith may ever validly
act with the purpose of discouraging the proper functioning of the shareholder voting process
and finding that when “the action taken [by the board] was taken in good faith, it [still]
constituted an unintended violation of the duty of loyalty that the board owed to the
shareholders”).
218. Id. at 663.
219. See Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 320 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Absent
confessions of improper purpose, the most important evidence of what a board intended to do is
often what effects its actions have.”). Asserting director intent in the reimbursement refusal
context requires an application of common sense. To assume that the board’s purpose is
shareholder disenfranchisement requires looking at the effect of a board’s decision to refuse
reimbursement on shareholder enfranchisement generally. In other words, would the refusal to
reimburse candidates systematically cause shareholders to be less likely to fund dissident
candidates in a contested board election? Given the logic the Delaware Supreme Court uses to
hold that the Bylaw in CA, Inc. is a protected element of the shareholder franchise, the
undermining of such a proposal would necessarily cause disenfranchisement. Common sense
assumes a disenfranchisement purpose when the board knows its actions would have the
deleterious effect of discouraging shareholder support for contested elections. See Thomas,
supra note 166, at 553–54 (discussing the sensibility of courts’ use of common sense to determine
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shareholders know that a board will wield its fiduciary-out clause
liberally, the promise of reimbursement is certain to be illusory. And
when the effect of a board’s action is clear and relatively certain, the
board will have “the impossible task of convincing the court that this
220
effect of the [action] was not intended.” Courts, of course, are
permitted to look past the purported “business” rationale when the
221
clear effect of an action is to interfere with the election process.
Thus, Blasius would be appropriate except in the case in which a
compelling justification makes it less likely that the board desired to
discourage future dissident candidate nominations.
On the other hand, a court will not invoke Blasius scrutiny when
shareholders have had a full and fair opportunity to vote and
222
ultimately ratify the board’s action. In such an instance, Blasius
would be inappropriate because the shareholder franchise was
exercised. This would be quite distinct from the proposed
hypothetical in which the shareholders’ only vote was for a candidate
who the board then unilaterally chose not to reimburse.
A final potential criticism is that the application of the Blasius
standard would eliminate the effect of the fiduciary-out clause
altogether. One could assert that any protection that a fiduciary-out
clause affords to shareholders would be necessarily eliminated by
holding the clause to an artificially high standard of review. This
argument misses the point, however; Chancellor Allen purposefully
avoided articulating a per se rule of invalidity in Blasius even when
the
board
acted
for
entrenchment
or
shareholder
223
disenfranchisement. Instead, Blasius review requires a compelling
justification—a high standard, to be sure, but one that enables the
224
board to explain its purpose and intended effect. If a board of
directors chose not to reimburse a candidate who ran for personal

whether defensive tactics taken by a board have a severe impact on the dissident candidates in a
contested election).
220. McBride & Gibbs, supra note 203, at 937.
221. See id. at 937–38 (noting instances in which the court has looked past the purported
rationale of a poison pill or change-of-control provision when its clear effect was to deter future
proxy contests).
222. See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 (Del. 1992) (“[Defendant’s] shareholders,
unlike those in both Blasius and Aprahamian, had a full and fair opportunity to vote on the
Amendments and did so. The result of the vote, ceding greater authority to the board, does not
under the circumstances implicate Unocal or Blasius.”).
223. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 662.
224. See id. (explaining the court’s rationale for not choosing a per se rule).
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reasons, the compelling justification would be demonstrated. Thus,
applying the Blasius standard to the exercise of a fiduciary-out clause
to prevent reimbursement would not have a drastically limiting effect
on directors’ legitimate discretion. Moreover, any argument invoking
the protection of shareholders as a justification is inherently
weakened by the fact that, in the context of reimbursing a successful
candidate, a majority of shareholders has voted for the dissident
226
candidate. To allow fiduciary outs without applying a strict standard
of review would, in effect, seriously hamper the ability of that
227
majority to cry foul after the election. Thus, to preserve shareholder
access to director elections, Delaware courts must utilize the Blasius
228
standard of review.
CONCLUSION
In response to the CA, Inc. decision, the Delaware General
Assembly approved rule changes to incorporate the new role for
shareholders in the nomination process of director candidates. These
amendments to the DGCL, signed into law by Governor Jack
Markell on April 10, 2009, signal a greater role for shareholder
229
activists and codify the CA, Inc. decision, ensuring its lasting impact

225. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 n.34 (Del. 2008)
(explaining one situation that would likely suffice as a compelling justification for the board to
refuse reimbursement to protect against shareholders reimbursing a candidate who ran based on
purely personal motivations). But see Posting of Lisa Fairfax to The Conglomerate, supra note
118 (asserting that it is unlikely that a candidate with purely personal motivations could
successfully attain a board position unless he could add value to the company).
226. For a discussion of the impropriety of using a fiduciary-out clause as a limitation on the
expressly voiced desires of shareholders, see supra Part III.B and note 144.
227. See 1 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 146, § 18:26.20 (“A fiduciary-out clause grants the
board broad authority, but presumably permits the proponents an avenue to challenge whether
the board breached its fiduciary duties. This is not much of an avenue . . . .”).
228. It is important to note, before concluding, that the arguments contained herein are
applicable specifically in the context of shareholder proposals and attempts by a board of
directors to limit the reimbursement of a successful short slate candidate. Most fiduciary-out
clauses serve to protect shareholders and thus do not risk the same abuses that a fiduciary out in
the CA, Inc. context would raise. When fiduciary-out clauses serve to protect shareholder
interests more directly, as in Omnicare, the same basis for implementing a Blasius standard of
review is not present. In no way should these arguments be taken to support the concept that
compelling justification review should be applied to invocations of a fiduciary-out clause to
protect against board action rather than shareholder action.
229. Sheri Qualters, Changes in Delaware Corporate Law Expected to Aid Activists Change
Bylaws, Elect Directors, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 23, 2009, at 7 (noting that the reimbursement provisions
added to Delaware corporate law after the CA, Inc. decision “are expected to aid shareholder
activists seeking bylaw changes, that boost their ability to nominate and elect directors”); see
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on the contours of Delaware corporate law. Likewise, the SEC felt
compelled to alter its rules after CA, Inc., proposing a rule change
that would incorporate the holding of CA, Inc. and allow
shareholders to propose bylaws that reimburse successful dissident
230
candidates. Thus, in the wake of CA, Inc. and the ensuing rule
changes it prompted, shareholders will likely avail themselves of their
231
newfound powers during the spring 2010 proxy season. These rule
232
changes indicate the importance of the CA, Inc. decision, but the
likely uptick in shareholder-proposed bylaws should also illustrate the
need for an appropriate standard of review. It is likely that with this
increase the SEC will see an influx of requests for no-action letters.
And although the Commission might tell complaining companies not
to exclude shareholder proposals for candidate reimbursement, the
SEC has no power to control the exercise of discretion that directors
have over fiduciary-out clauses. Instead, Delaware courts must play
the role of arbiter.
Delaware courts, then, will be faced again with the difficult
question of just how much discretion the board of directors ought to
have in determining whether a particular election contest is in the
best interest of the company and its shareholders. The Delaware
Supreme Court’s decision in CA, Inc. signaled its desire for strong
protections of shareholders’ rights to participate meaningfully in
233
director elections. Underscoring that protection, it follows that any
contested election that is not based on purely personal motivations
benefits the shareholders because it provides them with greater
choice and a voice in determining who manages their company. To
protect the rights of shareholders to participate in the selection of

also ROPES & GRAY LLP, AMENDMENTS TO DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW MAY
AID ACTIVIST STOCKHOLDERS (2009), http://www.ropesgray.com/delawaregeneralcorporation
lawmayaidactiviststockholders/ (describing the provisions of the amendments).
230. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-9046 &
34-60089, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232,
240, 249, 274).
231. Qualters, supra note 229 (predicting that the spring 2010 proxy season will see a
dramatic increase in shareholder-proposed bylaws).
232. In the aftermath of CA, Inc., some companies have recognized the inevitability of
shareholder participation in the nomination process and have embraced the reimbursement of
proxy expenses. See Joann S. Lublin, Fair Fight? Assistance Is Offered in Proxies, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 26, 2009, at B1 (noting that “HealthSouth Corp. is moving to become the first big U.S.
business to reimburse activist shareholders for the expense of unseating management-backed
directors”).
233. See supra Part II.B.
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the Delaware Supreme Court must use
director candidates,
heightened scrutiny to review any directorial claim that
reimbursement violates the board’s fiduciary duties. Specifically, the
compelling justification standard of review, articulated in Blasius, is
necessary given the very high risk that a board would act to entrench
itself and deter future candidates’ challenges.
Corporate governance reforms need not be accomplished solely
via legislative action. By ensuring that directors are accountable to
shareholders, courts can give deference to directors’ managerial
determinations without allowing directors to control the outcomes of
their own elections. Ultimately, boards of directors should answer for
their choices of executives and their allocation of compensation. The
public sentiment clearly favors a greater say for shareholders in the
decisions made in corporate boardrooms. But that sentiment calls for
a new structure for corporate management in which the shareholders
help manage the company. Rather than legislate such an upheaval,
shareholder participation can be facilitated within the current
structure. Instead of enacting compensation legislation, for example,
a standard of review that protects shareholder participation can help
shareholders realize the influence they can have on this issue. By
assuring that shareholders have a meaningful ability to participate in
the election of directors, courts can better uphold the fundamental
principles of corporate law without uprooting the established
structure.

234. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 237 (Del. 2008)
(explaining the court’s rationale for the need for great protection of any embodiment of the
shareholder franchise).

